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This paper focuses on a number of key research questions: (1) What is the relative 
importance  of  individual,  job-related  and  organisational  characteristics  in 
explaining differences in earnings? (2)  Do job characteristics such as hierarchical 
level and functional domain exercise a significant influence on pay differentials if 
we  control  for  the  traditional  human  capital  factors?  (3)  Do  organisational 
characteristics such as size and the sector in which the company is active exercise a 
significant influence on pay differentials if we control for  the traditional human 
capital factors  and job-related pay determinants? In order to assess  the relative 
importance of these pay determinants, use is made of linear regression and analysis 
of variance. The analysis draws on data from the Salary Survey, which generated 
pay details for a total of more than 15,000 Belgian white-collar workers. Based on 
the analysis, we come to the conclusion that the five main determinants, in order of 
importance, are number of years' work experience; level of education; hierarchical 
level; sector of employment; and the nationality of the parent company. A further 
striking feature  is  that more  than 50%  of  the  total  explained  variance  can be 
attributed to the three features which receive a great deal of attention in traditional 
human capital approaches to pay differentials: level of education, work experience 
and gender. WHO EARNS MORE (AND WHY)? 
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL, JOB-RELATED AND 
ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN  EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN 
EARNINGS 
1.  Introduction 
Research into the determinants of pay levels has a long tradition. Much of this 
research is concentrated on the explanatory power of one or a limited set of 
determinants. Three schools can clearly be identified. 
1. Research into the influence of employee  characteristics.  Many of these studies 
focus on testing the human capital theory and accordingly devote a  good 
deal of attention to the effect of work experience (Duncan & Hoffman, 1978; 
Holzer, 1990; Strober, 1990; Williams, 1991) and level of education (Mincer, 
1993;  Nollen  &  Gaertner,  1991;  Strober,  1990;  Weiss,  1995)  on  pay 
differentials. 
2. Research into the influence of job  level.  To the extent that job characteristics 
receive  attention in analyses  of pay differentials  at all,  they are usually 
measured only by means of the hierarchical or job level (Hartog, 1986). The 
job level is generally 'degraded' to the status of a variable which mediates 
the  relationship between individual attributes  and level  of pay (Halaby, 
1978; Malkiel & Malkiel, 1973; Rosenbaum, 1980). 
3. Research  into  the  influence  of  organisational  characteristics.  This  type  of 
research  looks  in the  first  place  at  the  influence  of  the  organisational 
demography - and is thus once again an indirect measurement of the effect 
of employee characteristics -, organisational size (Brown &  Medoff, 1989; 
Pfeffer  &  Davis-Blake,  1990),  and the absolute  (Conyon,  1997;  Hwang & 
Snider, 1995; Jensen & Murphy, 1991)  or relative (Main, 1991) performance 
of the company. 
The central question in this paper is whether the effects of specific factors on 
one or more of the levels referred to as observed in these studies remain intact if 
the variables of the other two levels are included. To  this end we build up a 
regression model which attempts to explain pay differentials on the basis of a 
wide range of individual, job-related and organisational features. This enables 
us to answer the following research questions: 2 
1. What is the relative importance of individual, job-related and organisational 
characteristics in explaining pay differentials? Which cluster of determinants 
has the greatest explanatory power? 
2. Do  job  characteristics  such  as  hierarchical  level  and  functional  domain 
exercise  a  significant influence on pay differentials if we control for  the 
traditional human capital factors? In the pure form of human capital theory, 
job characteristics are regarded as irrelevant in explaining pay differentials. 
The value of this theoretical position is tested. 
3. Do  organisational characteristics such as  size and the sector in which the 
company is active exercise a significant influence on pay differentials if we 
control for the traditional human capital factors? According to neo-classical 
economic theories, employees with the same qualifications and equivalent 
jobs  receive  equal  pay  in  adequately  functioning  product  and  factor 
markets, and pay differentials between sectors or between large and small 
companies are primarily a reflection of compositional effects (differences in 
characteristics of the workforce).  By combining individual, job-related and 
organisational variables in the analysis, this theoretical position, too, can be 
tested. 
The analysis uses data from the Salary Survey (Sels & Overlaet, 2000). This was 
a large-scale survey, which generated pay details on a total of more than 15,000 
white-collar workers  (in  private and public, profit as  well as  not-for-profit 
sectors). The model tested in this paper explains roughly 66% of the observed 
pay  differentials.  It is  striking  that more  than  50%  of  the  total  explained 
variance can be attributed to the three individual characteristics which receive a 
good  deal  of  attention  in  traditional  human  capital  approaches  to  pay 
differentials: gender, level of education and work experience. 
The  next  section  of  this  paper  briefly  outlines  the  methodology.  The 
regression  model  is  then  explained  which  underlies  our  interpretations. 
Thirdly, the precise importance of  individual, job-related and organisational 
pay determinants is assessed. 
2.  Survey.  design 
Several attempts have been made in the past to gain an insight into pay levels 
using random samples. These attempts usually generated a very low response. 
Moreover, it is striking that in many surveys the item non-response to pay-
related  questions is  extremely high.  This  means that until recently the only 
source of data on earnings available in Belgium were those produced by the 
National Institute for Statistics. However, these data are subject to limitations, 
since  companies  with  fewer  than  ten  employees  and  organisations  from 
extremely  important  sectors  such  as  health  care,  education,  government 
administration and not-for-profit are excluded. Moreover, these databases do 3 
not lend themselves to explanatory analyses, since they contain no information 
on the most essential person and job-related pay determinants. 
For  these  reasons we deliberately  opted to  abandon the random sample 
approach (which would anyway have been limited due to cost considerations). 
The survey, which forms the basis for this paper was distributed via the job 
advertisement paper Vacature,  which has a very high circulation among all 
hierarchical and educational levels of white-collar workers (CIM Survey, 1999). 
This method produced the very high response of 15,009  valid measurement 
points,  but  does  create  the  problem  that  the  sample  reliability  is  almost 
impossible  to  determine.  This  clearly  limits  the  scope  for  statistical 
generalisation. However, this  limitation applies to  all  employee-based  (non-
administrative) wage surveys. The fact that a  random sample was not used 
does not mean that no effort was made to define clearly the survey population 
or the empirical field of validity when building the Salary Survey. Blue-collar 
workers are excluded from this population. The results relate solely to white-
collars (including all ranks of management). Part-time workers are also ruled 
out. The analyses concentrate on full-time employment in order to achieve a 
certain standardisation of working hours. 
A number of important interventions were made in order to improve the fit 
between  the  distributions  of  sample  and population.  The  most  important 
intervention is the systematic re-weighting of the salary data. Not all groups in 
the labour force participated in the Salary Survey to an equal extent. Certain 
groups, such as men and the more highly educated, were over-represented. The 
salary data generated by the survey were therefore re-weighted on the basis of 
the characteristics 'educational level' and 'gender'. This was done using the 
program Weight 2.1  for Windows (Hajnal, 1995), a program for re-weighting 
samples  on the basis  of  population  statistics.  The  re-weighting  allows  the 
following  important question to  be answered:  Suppose that the educational 
level of the respondents were identical to that of the wage-earning labour force, 
and suppose that women were represented in the survey just as strongly as on 
the labour market, how would the pay differentials then look? However, we 
have to acknowledge that this re-weighting cannot neutralise problems of self-
selection.  Self-selection can for  example imply that someone who considers 
himself successful is more inclined to report that success through participation 
in this type of survey. 
A final methodological note relates to the precise meaning of the term 'pay' 
in this paper. By 'pay' we understand remuneration for labour, formed in an 
employment relationship with an employer. The independent variable in the 
analyses is always the natural logarithm of the gross monthly pay. This gross 
pay  is  the basic  pay of  the  employee,  before  any fiscal  or social  security 
deductions. This amount not only includes the hours of work performed, but 
also  the hours of absence during illness or holiday, for which the employee 
retains the right to normal pay. This amount also includes overtime pay, as well 4 
as  an  estimate  in  monetary  terms  of  various  fringe  benefits.  Premiums, 
incentives, bonuses, commission and similar income items are also included in 
this amount. 
3.  Distribution of salaries 
Table 1 presents the distribution of salaries, which emerged from the Salary 
Survey after re-weighting. 
Table 1.  Gross monthly pay after re-weighting on the basis of the characteristics 
'education level' and 'gender' (in Euro). 
Industrial  Service sectors  Public and  Total 
Percentiles  sectors  not-for profit 
sectors 
95% earns more than ...  1.480  1.502  1.534  1.497 
75% earns more than ...  2.096  1.996  2.076  2.037 
50% earns more than ...  2.699  2.538  2.615  2.579 
25% earns.more than ...  3.511  3.294  3.147  3.282 
5% earns more than ...  5.631  5.101  4.418  5.068 
P951P5 (salary dispersion)  3.80  3.39  2.88  3.39 
If we look at the top of the pay ladder, a  number of large  differences  are 
apparent. In the industrial sectors, the top 5% of salaries are above EUR 5,631 
gross per month. In the services sectors this line can be drawn at EUR 5,101, and 
in the public and not-for-profit sectors at EUR 4,418.  In other words, the top 
earners in industry earn more than those in the services; the top earners in the 
public and not-for-profit sectors limp along behind. The lower end of the pay 
ladders is about the same in all three sectors. In other words, there is a wide pay 
differential in the high pay categories and a small differential on the lowest 
rungs of the pay ladder. The 95/5 ratio, or the ratio between the 95th and fifth 
percentile, gives an impression of the salary dispersion. In industry, white-collar 
workers situated at the 95th  percentile earn 3.8 times as much per month as 
white-collar workers at the fifth percentile. This multiple in the government and 
non-profit sectors is 2.88, which indicates a more egalitarian pay structure. In 
international perspective, Belgium has  a  relatively limited  salary  dispersion 
(OEeD, 1996). 
In this paper we go in search of an explanation for  the pay differentials, 
which emerge in Table 1. We do this on the basis of a linear regression with the 
natural  logarithm  of  gross  monthly  salary  as  independent  variable.  The 
following variables are included as potential determinants. 5 
Table 2.  Variables integrated in regression analyses as potential determinants of pay 
differentials 
Individual characteristics  Job-related characteristics  Company characteristics 
1. Educational level  4. Hierarchicalleve1  12. Sector of  employment 
2. Work experience  5. Functional domain  13. Size of the organisation 
3. Gender  6. Number of subordinates  14. Nationality of employer 
7. Size of budget managed 
8. Responsibility in the job 
9. Job autonomy 
10. Complexity of the job 
11. Working hours 
Table 3 presents the results. The way in which the different variables are coded 
can be derived from this table. For the variables 'responsibility', 'job autonomy' 
and 'job complexity', the measurement method is explained in the Appendix. Table 3.  Linear regression with the natural logarithm ot the gross monmly wage as uepenuem VdHdUlt:. 
Parameter estimate after  Exponentiated parameter  Interpretation based on the unstandardised parameters 
logarithmic transformation  estimate  (  exponentiated) 
Unstandar- Standardised  Unstandar- Standardised 
dised  dised 
Intercept  10.7243 **  0  1.127  1  1.127 Eur = median wage of male operational staft without work experience, 
secondary education, working 32 hours/week in the after-sales services of an 
organisation in the socio-cultural sector with less than 50 employees 
Individual characteristics 
Degree of higher  .1207 **  .1580  1.1283  1.1712  Someone who followed higher education outside the university will earn a 
education outside  gross monthly wage which will be on average 12.8% higher than the pay of a 
university  similar worker who has enjoyed no more than a secondary education 
University degree  .2520 **  .1580  1.2866  1.2599  University graduates enjoy a gross monthly salary which is 28.6% higher than 
that of an employee with only a secondary education background 
Work experience  .0301 **  .8432  1.0306  2.3238  An increase in experience with one year is accompanied by a 3.06% pay rise 
(Work experience) 2  -.0004 **  -04085  0.9996  0.6646  Pay rises due to increasing work experience reduce over time 
Gender  -.0785 **  -.1063  0.9245  0.8992  Women earn on average 7.55% less than men ((1  - 0.9245) * 100) 
Job-related characteristics  I 
Professional  .0877 **  .0969  1.0917  1.1018  Pay of professionals is on average 9.17% higher than that of operational staft 
Middle management  .1755 **  .1925  1.1918  1.2123  Pay of middle managers is on average 19.18% higher than that of oper. staft 
Senior management  .3462 .*  .2282  104137  1.2563  Pay of senior managers is on average 41.37% higher than that of oper. staff 
Complexity of the job  .0002 (n.s.)  .0029  1.0002  1.0029  Complexity of the job has a significant effect on pay level 
Responsibility  .0060 *  .0530  1.0060  1.0544  A higher degree of responsibility in the job is accompanied by higher pay 
Job autonomy  .0038 **  .0330  1.0038  1.0336  A larger amount of job autonomy leads to a higher pay level 
In charge of at least  .0297 **  .0405  1.0301  1.0413  Someone in charge of at least one employee earns an average of around 3% 
one subordinate  more than those who are not in charge of other employees 
I  n charge of at least 6  .0216 *  .0249  1.0218  1.0252  Someone in charge of at least 6 subordinates has a salary which is on 
subordinates  average 5.26% higher than the salary of a person without subordinates 
In charge of at least 16  -.0186 (n.s.)  -.0162  .9816  .9839  No additional effect 
subordinates 
In charge of at least 30  .0353 •  .0236  1.0359  1.0239  People with 30 or more subordinates receive a gross monthly wage which is 
subordinates  an average of 7% higher than colleagues with no subordinates Table 3 (continued).  Linear regression with the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage as dependent variable 
Parameter estimate after  Exponentiated parameter  Interpretation based on the unstandardised parameters (exponentiated) 
logarithmic transfonnation  estimate 
Unstandar- Standardised  Unstandar- Standardised 
dised  dised 
Budget managed  .0220 (n.s.)  .0283  1.0222  1.0287  No significant effect 
Budget managed of  .0220 (n.s.)  .0236  1.0222  1.0239  No significant effect 
EUR 25.000 or less 
Budget of more than  .0424 *  .0331  1.0433  1.0337  A person who manages a budget of more than EUR 25.000 earns an average 
EUR 25.000  of 9% more than employees who do not manage budgets. 
Working hours a week  .0033 **  .0639  1.0033  1.0660  Each hour extra that an employee works generates an average of 0.33% 
(32 hours at least)  more pay 
Administration  .0208 (n.s.)  .0240  1.0210  1.0243  Pay in administration is not significantly different from pay in after-sales 
HR management  .0235 (n.s.)  .0132  1.0238  1.0133  Pay in HR management is not significantly different from pay in after-sales 
Technical support  .0255 (n.s.)  .0178  1.0258  1.0180  Pay in technical support is not significantly different from pay in after-sales 
Logistics  .0300 (n.s.)  .0153  1.0305  1.0154  Pay in logistics is not significantly different from pay in after-sales 
Finance I bookkeeping  .0337 (n.s.)  .0259  1.0343  1.0262  Pay in finance is not significantly different from pay in after-sales 
Sales  .0413 (n.s.)  .0434  1.0422  1.0444  Pay in sales is not significantly different from pay level in after-sales 
Marketing  .0431  (n.s.)  .0181  1.0440  1.0183  Pay in marketing is not significantly different from pay in after-sales 
General management  .0680 *  .0430  1.0704  1.0440  Pay in general management is 7% higher than pay in after-sales 
Operations  .0709 *  .0712  1.0735  1.0738  Pay level in operations is 7.35% higher than pay level in after-sales 
Engineering  .0861  *  .0353  1.0900  1.0359  Pay in engineering is on average 9% higher than pay in after-sales  I 
R&D  .0939 **  .0392  1.0984  1.0400  Pay in R&D is on average 9.84% higher than pay in after-sales 
EDPIIT  .1190 **  .0702  1.1264  1.0727  Pay in EDPIIT is on average 12.64% higher than pay in after-sales 
Organisational determinants 
At least 50 employees  .0397 **  .0468  1.0405  1.0479  Gross monthly salaries in companies with 50 or more employees are on 
average 4.05% higher than in companies having less than 50 workers 
At least 200  .0264 *  .0358  1.0268  1.0364  The gross monthly salary in companies with 200 or more employees is no 
employees  less than 6.8% higher than in companies with less than 50 employees 
I  (1.0405 * 1.0268) 
I At least 500  .0383 *.  .0519  1.0390  1.0533  The gross monthly salary in companies with at least 500 employees is 11% 
I employees  higher than in companies with less than 50 workers (1.0405' 1.0268 * 
1.0390) 
- - -
** p < 0.001; * P < 0.01; n.s. not significant Table 3 (continued).  Linear regression with the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage as dependent variable 
Parameter estimate after  Exponentiated parameter  Interpretation based on the unstandardised parameters (exponentiated) 
logarithmic transformation  estimate 
Unslandar- Standardised  Unstandar- Standardised 
dised  dised 
Hotel and catering  -.0570 (n.s.)  -.0166  .9446  .9835  Pay in H&C does not differ significantly from pay in socia-cultural sector 
Public selVices  .0325 (n.s.)  .0288  1.0330  1.0292  Pay in public selVice does not differ significantly from pay in socia-cult. sector 
Retail  .0355 (n.s.)  .0240  1.0361  1.0243  Pay in retail does not differ Significantly from pay in socia-cultural sector 
Telecommunication  .0363 (n.s.)  .0197  1.0370  1.0199  Pay in telecom does not differ significantly from pay in socia-cultural sector 
Transport  .0451  *  .0273  1.0461  1.0277  Pay in transport is on average 4.61% higher than pay in socia-cultural sector 
SelVices to companies  .0592 *  .0443  1.0610  1.0453  Pay in selVices to companies is on average 6.1 % higher than the pay level in 
the socia-cultural sector 
Textile  .0652 *  .0278  1.0674  1.0282  Pay in textiles is on average 6.74% higher than pay in socia-cultural sector 
Health care  .0719 **  .0491  1.0745  1.0503  Pay in health care is on average 7.45% higher than pay in socia-cult. sector 
Building industry  .0771  **  .0344  1.0802  1.0350  Pay in building industry is on average 8% higher than pay in socia-cult. sector 
Wood and paper  .0790 **  .0354  1.0822  1.0360  Pay in wood/paper is on average 8.22% higher than pay in socia-cult. sector 
Food industry  .0810 **  .0403  1.0844  1.0411  Pay in food industry is on average 8.44% higher than pay in socia-cult. sector 
Education  .0852 .*  .0569  1.0889  1.0585  Pay in education is on average 8.89% higher than pay in socia-cultural sector  I 
Metal industry  .0863 **  .0632  1.0901  1.0652  Pay in metal is on average 9,01 % higher than pay In socia-cult. sector  I 
Information technology  .1055 **  .0438  1.1113  1.0447  Pay in IT is on average 11.1% higher than pay in the socia-cultural sector 
Banks and insurance  .1334 **  .1228  1.1427  1.1307  Pay in banks and insurance companies is on average 14.27% higher than the 
pay level in the socia-cultural sector 
Chemical industry  .1435 **  .1035  1.1543  1.1090  Pay in chemical industry is on average 15.43% higher than the pay level in 
the socia-cultural sector 
Energy sector  .1970 **  .0598  1.2177  1.0616  Pay level in energy sector is on average 21.77% higher than pay in the socio-
cultural sector 
Dutch company  .  0350 *  .0197  1.0356  1.0199  Pay in Dutch companies is on average 3.56% higher than in Belgian camp  . 
Japanese company  .0378 (n.s.)  .0085  1.0385  1.0085  Pay in Japanese companies does not differ from pay in Belgian companies 
I  French company  .  0531  *  .0207  1.0545  1.0209  Pay in French companies is on average 5.45% higher than In Belgian camp  . 
• British company  .  0790 **  .0278  1.0822  1.0282  Pay in British companies is on average 8.22% higher than in Belgian camp  . 
German company  .1001  **  .0472  1.1053  1.0483  Pay in German companies is on average 10.53% higher than in Belgian 
companies 
American company  .  1455 **  .1023  1.1566  1.1077  Pay in US companies is on average 15.66% higher than pay in Belgian camp  . 
** p < 0.001; *  P < 0.01; n.s. not significant 9 
The combined explanatory power of all the determinants is large. Together they 
explain 65.9% of the total variation in pay levels (Adjusted ~  = .659). We can 
thus  attribute  roughly  two-thirds  of  the  observed  pay  differences  to  the 
reported individual, job-related and organisational characteristics. The fact that 
this  explanatory potential  is not even  higher is due to  the  fact  that many 
characteristics, which could have an impact on pay levels, were not included in 
the  Salary Survey.  Examples include company strategy, trade union power, 
company performance, capital structure and complexity of the business, degree 
of competition on the labour market (Milkovich & Newman, 1999), individual 
performance level (Bushman,  Indjejikian  &  Smith,  1996;  Nollen  &  Gaertner, 
1991),  etc.  Most of these factors  are very difficult to include in an employee 
survey. 
4.  Explanation of pay differentials 
This  section  explains  the  main  determinants  from  the  foregoing  model. 
Attention is focussed on the relative importance of individual, job-related and 
organisational characteristics. 
4.1  Individual determinants 
Three  individual  characteristics  were  included  in  the  analysis:  level  of 
education, work experience and gender. 
Level of education. In competitive models such as the human capital theory, a 
good deal of attention is devoted to returns on investment in education and 
training. The central assumption is that all pay should be equal if all employees 
were capable of performing all jobs without training, and were indifferent in 
their search behaviour with regard to the full array of jobs. Pay differentials are 
then explained by the fact that deviations exist in these assumptions. 
The human capital theory attributes pay differentials to differences in initial 
schooling and (on the job) training. Schooling, education, training, etc., are seen 
as investments in human capital or productive capacity. It is assumed that an 
individual selects an educational or training programme on the basis of an 
analysis of costs and benefits. A rational person will invest in his human capital 
if the benefits of that investment ultimately equal or surpass its costs.  The 
willingness to invest is thus dependent on the expectation that the investment 
will  lead  to  a  higher  pay  level.  Pay  differentials  based  on  educational 
differences thus encourage the willingness to invest. 
The regression analysis confirms the great importance of educational level as 
a determinant of pay level. The analysis shows that, if an white-collar employee 
has followed higher education, his or her pay will on average be 12.8% higher 
than the pay of a (similar) worker who has enjoyed a secondary education (or a 
lower level of education). University graduates enjoy a gross monthly salary, 
which is 28.7% higher on average than that of an employee with a secondary (or 10 
even  lower)  educational  background.  On  this  basis  it  can  therefore  be 
concluded that the level of education retains an important predictive power, 
even when job-related and organisational characteristics are included in the 
explanatory model. This finding does not necessarily imply a confirmation of 
the human capital logic, since there is a wide range of competing explanations 
for this effect of educational level.  The 'screening hypothesis' is particularly 
influential here.  We will discuss two variants of this hypothesis, namely the 
signalling model (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1974) and the credentialist perspective 
(Thurow, 1975). 
The human capital theory posits that more education leads to higher pay 
because it is  also  accompanied by higher productivity.  Signalling  models,  by 
contrast, posit that employers will pay better educated  employees a  higher 
salary even if their education has no direct effect on their productivity. These 
models do begin  from  the  assumption that there  is  a  correlation  between 
capability and productivity and that, if potential employees are divided into a 
group  with  relatively  high capability  and  a  group  with  relatively  limited 
capability, an additional investment in education for the former group 'costs' 
relatively less  (Strober,  1990).  Given  this  cost  differential  together  with the 
higher remuneration which employers link to a higher education, it is also more 
attractive for the more capable group to invest in additional education and thus 
to 'signal' their higher capability (and productivity) to employers. This confirms 
employers in their assumption that better educated workers are also  more 
productive, and affirms their use of educational level as an indicator or signal of 
higher productivity. 
In most signalling models it is posited that the level of education has an effect 
only at the start of a  person's career.  Education helps to open the door to 
employment at a time when the employer cannot yet fall back on factors such as 
individual productivity (Bills, 1988). The level of education is then used as an 
indicator for assessing that productivity. As the employee progresses in his or 
her career, the initial level of education could weigh in importance in favour of 
performance indicators.  This  assumption is refuted  by additional  analyses, 
which demonstrate that the level of education does not lose its explanatory 
power as  the number of years of service increases  (Sels  &  Overlaet, 2000). 
Internal labour market theories offer a more robust explanation here, arguing 
that the screening on commencement of employment not only determines the 
initial job and starting pay, but also the career ladder(s) to which employees 
gain access. 
A completely different perspective is offered by Thurow's credentialist theory. 
Characteristic of this theory is that Thurow sees pay much more as a  fixed 
characteristic of a job, which is separate from the person who holds that job. 
Productivity is not seen as a function of educational level, but rather of the way 
in which employers give  form  to  their jobs  (level  of  responsibility,  capital 
intensity, promotion opportunities, etc.) and the nature and extent of on-the-job 
training provided by that employer. On the basis of this assumption, it can be 
expected that differentials  will not be directly  dependent on differences in 
education, but rather on differences between the jobs offered by employers. 
However, this  assumption  must be  refuted  on  the basis  of  the  regression. 11 
Education  level  retains  a  real  influence  on  pay  differentials,  even  after 
controlling for the hierarchical level of the job,  the functional  domain within 
which the job is situated, the specific job characteristics and the number of years 
of work experience (as an indicator for the extent of on-the-job training). This 
confirms earlier findings by Hartog (1986), who indicates that the pay structure 
is much more than a simple transformation of the existing job structures. 
It should however be noted here that Thurow's theories also  allow for  a 
correlation between educational level and pay, by stating that candidates on the 
labour market are involved in competition to acquire jobs. These candidates are 
ranked by employers; better educated clients are systematically higher up the 
pecking order thus created, because educational level is  used by employers 
primarily as a signal of 'trainability'. Employees are encouraged above all  to 
invest in additional education, not so much because they will then be able to 
attain higher pay through higher productivity, but because they will be able to 
secure their position in the market for jobs. In this sense, this line of reasoning 
does not contradict the results of the regression analysis. 
Work experience. The human capital theory explains pay differentials not only on 
the basis of education, but also the number of years' work experience (Mincer, 
1974; Weiss, 1986). It is argued that the productivity of a worker (the value of 
his human capital) increases with his work experience. Moreover, the number 
of years of work experience is used as a 'proxy' for non-observable investments 
in on-the-job training (Duncan & Hoffman, 1978). The human capital approach 
thus assumes that increasing work experience is accompanied by a steady rise 
in pay (Strober, 1990). This relationship is confirmed in the regression analysis. 
The human capital theory  also  predicts  that investments  in human capital 
decline in a monotonous trend with age. Experience also ages, possibly leading 
to a fall in productivity (depreciation of human capital). As a consequence, pay 
increases reduce over time. This 'rust effect' explains why pay profiles have a 
concave rather than a linear character. In order to test this concave character, 
the variable 'work experience' is incorporated in the model both linearly and 
quadratically (Table 3).  This quadratic term is both significant and negative, 
indicating that pay increases do indeed weaken over time. 
If  we replace work experience by length of service for the current employer, 
the  analysis  produces  virtually  identical  effects.  The  interpretation  from  a 
human  capital  perspective  is  also  virtually  identical.  Other  theoretical 
perspectives do not in fact dispute these observations, but do take issue with 
the way in which they are interpreted by the human capital theory. A very 
influential alternative is  offered by efficiency wage models. These claim that 
companies which are confronted by high staff turnover or which have problems 
in measuring individual productivity, develop pay schemes which encourage 
workers to stay with the company and to maintain maximum productivity. 
Such a pay scheme may mean that employees are paid less than their actual 
level of value creation in the early years, but higher than this level later in their 
careers. This gives workers the prospect in their early years of higher pay in 
later years. This can encourage them to stay and to avoid slacking (avoiding 
risk of dismissal). This effect continues in later years, since if they move to a 12 
different employer, employees risk falling back to a pay level which is at or 
even below the level of their actual added value creation, rather than above it. 
According to efficiency  wage models, therefore, pay does not increase with 
work experience or seniority because this reflects an increase in productivity (as 
a result of on-the-job training), but because employers feel  compelled to give 
their employees additional stimuli (Medoff & Abraham, 1981). A similar line of 
thinking  has been developed  by internal  labour  market  theories.  Whereas 
according  to  efficiency  wage  theories  the  root  of  pay increases  encourage 
employee  loyalty,  internal labour  market theories  attribute this  function  to 
promotion opportunities (Osterman, 1984). 
Gender.  The regression analysis indicates that women, ceteris paribus, earn an 
average  of  7.55%  less  than men  (Table 3).  This  gender  effect,  too,  is  often 
interpreted from a human capital perspective. According to this theory, women 
adopt different 'utility functions' in their career and life planning, and this leads 
them to make different choices (Strober, 1990). This manifests itself particularly 
in their choice of training programmes with a smaller 'pay-off', jobs with high 
starting salaries and low demands with regard to on-the-job training and, above 
all, of regular (part-time) career interruption (Polachek, 1987). The expectation 
that women will interrupt their careers more frequently is used as a basis for 
the human capital hypothesis that women's starting pay is just as high as for 
men but their 'age-pay' profile  is  at the same  time  much flatter.  Precisely 
because of expected  interruptions, they are also claimed to be less willing to 
invest in on-the-job training, because they do not expect to be active on the 
labour market for long enough for  this investment to repay itself. The actual 
interruption is moreover accompanied by a depreciation of human capital. 
Further analyses bear out the supposition that the pay profile of women is 
flatter. However, the assertion that the starting pay for women is just as high as 
for men is refuted on the basis of these analyses: women's starting pay is also 
lower (Sels & Overlaet, 2000). This means that women do not (only) build up a 
disadvantage  relative  to  men  (among  other  things  through  more  career 
interruptions), but are evidently faced with a pay handicap at the starting line. 
This finding, which is in line with known studies, such as those by England et 
al. (1988) and Duncan and Prus (1992) strengthens the suspicion that the human 
capital approach provides a distorted picture of reality. It  should be pointed out 
here that recent research also provides a more subtle impression of the effect of 
career  interruptions  on  pay  development.  For  example  Albrecht,  Edin, 
Sundstrom,  and  Vroman  (1999)  demonstrate  that  the  influence  of  career 
interruption  on  pay  development  depends  greatly  on  the  nature  of  that 
interruption, and that the negative effect of interruptions on the development of 
pay is significantly stronger among men than among women. 
Segmentation theories offer an alternative explanation. Segmentation should 
be seen as a collective name for processes, which lead to a limitation of  the 
competition for  jobs.  This means  that certain (types)  of workers have more 
difficulty in gaining access to certain (types) of jobs (with a given pay level), 
because  employers  select  candidates  on the  basis  of  individual  or  group 
characteristics (Glebbeek, 1993). The selection criteria adopted may be applied 13 
so systematically that they result in a segmentation of workers,  a segmentation 
according to the type of jobs for which they are eligible. It is not only workers 
but also jobs that are segmented, by the types of position for which they form a 
good springboard. This segmentation of jobs gives rise to career paths or job 
chains. 
Segmentation  of  workers  means  that  individual  or  group  characteristics 
determine  which  jobs  these  workers  can  attain.  Processes  of  statistical 
discrimination can play a particular role here. Statistical discrimination occurs 
primarily where employers have imperfect information about the productivity 
of candidate employees and therefore use characteristics of the employee as a 
source  of  information  about  his/her  productivity.  It is  thus  possible  that 
employers assess the 'attraction' of women lower during recruitment and when 
determining pay levels, for  example because they expect women to interrupt 
their careers more frequently.  Reference is  made to statistical discrimination 
among other things in the 'labour queue' theory, which was developed in the 
context of Thurow's 'credentialist view' (see  above).  Selection occurs  not so 
much on the basis of an assessment of individual qualities, but on the basis of 
group averages. This gives rise to  a  'labour queue' which can vary per job 
group,  but  which  nevertheless  means  that  people  with  a  lower  level  of 
education, women, members of ethnic minorities, etc. are often at the end of the 
queue when it comes  to  jobs  with the highest pay and/or the best career 
prospects. This segmentation of female workers can be reinforced by existing 
segmentation of jobs.  For example, statistical discrimination at the 'entry level' 
may mean that women more frequently end up in positions which form part of 
a less promising job chain or career path and which in this sense provide a less 
resilient springboard to higher and better paid positions. 
4.2  Job-related determinants 
To  the  extent  that  research  into  pay  differentials  devotes  attention  to  job 
characteristics,  this is  usually limited  to an analysis of  the influence of  the 
hierarchical level. In the regression model an attempt was made to measure the 
effect of the functional domain as well. Moreover, a wide range of more specific 
job characteristics was integrated in the model (complexity, autonomy, budget 
managed, etc.). 
We integrate these job characteristics in the first place in order to investigate 
whether characteristics of jobs have an effect on levels of pay if we control for 
the  traditional  'human  capital'  variables  such  as  education  and  work 
experience.  The presence of such an effect suggests that the human capital 
theory is by no means able to explain the full range of pay differentials (Hartog, 
1986). 
Hierarchical level. The model distinguishes between four levels (Table 3). 'Senior 
management'  is  understood  as  the  general  manager and  the  heads  of  the 
corporate departments who report directly to  the  general manager.  'Middle 
management' includes managers who are in charge of implementation and do 
not report directly to the general director. 'Professionals' are employees in staff 14 
departments or staff positions.  Finally,  'operational staff'  are  understood  as 
workers who carry out a clearly defined task in a subordinate role, for example 
a bookkeeper who works under an administrative director. 
Based on the regression analysis it is possible to  measure the effect of the 
hierarchical  level.  This  effect  is  considerable.  The  gross  monthly  pay  of 
professionals, all  things being equal, is on average 9.2%  higher than that of 
operational staff.  The salaries of middle managers are  an average  of  19.1% 
above those of operational staff, while the monthly salary of senior managers is 
an average of 41.4% higher than the monthly pay of operational staff. It can be 
deduced from these differences in pay levels that the salary is not only a form of 
compensation, but is  also a  concrete and highly visible  symbol of authority 
(Robinson  &  Kelley,  1979;  Wright,  1978).  The  level  of  the  job  thus  has  a 
significant effect on the level of pay, even if we control for the human capital 
factors 'work experience' and 'education' (d. Hartog, 1986; Rosenbaum, 1980). 
Conversely,  of  course  - and  this  underlines  the  great  importance  of  the 
individual characteristics - both educational level, work experience and gender 
retain a substantial explanatory power, even where the pay levels of employees 
at the same hierarchical level are compared with each other. 
Functional domain.  Pay differences occur not only between hierarchical levels; 
the domain to  which a job  belongs can also  help determine the employee's 
monthly salary. 
The results show that the domain 'after-sales service' contains the lowest pay 
(intercept). This domain forms  a  single cluster together with other domains, 
which show no significant mutual pay differentials. These are the commercial 
domains and the central services:  logistics,  marketing,  sales,  administration, 
finance, bookkeeping and HRM.  The fact that this large group of functional 
domains, after controlling for all  manner of compositional effects,  shows no 
mutual significant pay differentials, indicate that the pay differential between 
functional  domains  is  very limited.  In terms  of  remuneration,  therefore,  it 
makes  little  difference  whether  an  employee  builds  a  career  in  personnel 
management or in marketing or bookkeeping, for example. Only four domains 
show a significant deviation from the reference category in terms of average 
pay level. In the first place these are the operational departments: the primary 
process where the actual added value is created. However, it is primarily the 
technical domains such as engineering, R&D  and EDP lIT where significantly 
higher wage levels are found. 
We must however conclude that the functional pay differential is fairly low. 
American  companies,  for  example,  show  a  much  stronger  functional 
differentiation (Foster, 1985). This is a very important observation in the context 
of  human  resources  management.  Functional  or  'horizontal'  pay  levelling 
simplifies the construction of multifunctional career ladders. If  it is the intention 
that  employees  should  develop  expertise  during  their  career  in  various 
functional  domains, it is  a  good  thing if the  pay differentials  between the 
different posts are not too great (Pfeffer, 1994). 15 
Job  characteristics.  In  addition  to  the  hierarchical  level  and  the  functional 
domain, a wide array of other job characteristics were surveyed in the Salary 
Survey. We refer to the regression for  the effects  of these characteristics. We 
shall limit ourselves here to a brief discussion. 
We shall first discuss the effect of the number of subordinates on level of pay. 
We pointed out earlier that hierarchical level has a  strong effect.  Naturally, 
employees at higher levels of the hierarchy are in charge of more employees (on 
average). The fact, that middle managers have a higher salary on average than 
professionals, can therefore be explained in part by the fact that they have a 
larger number of subordinates. The question we ask ourselves here is whether 
the number of subordinates has an additional impact on pay levels if we control 
for differences in hierarchical level. The regression analysis indicates that this 
effect is indeed present, though the additional explanatory power is limited. 
Those in management positions,  all  things being equal,  earn an average of 
around 3% more than those who are not in charge of other employees. This 
situation changes where managers have 30 or more subordinates: their pay is 
then an average of 7% higher than for colleagues with no subordinates. The size 
of the budgets, which are managed in a person's job, also has a significant effect 
on top of that of hierarchical level. However, this effect only occurs once the 
budgets exceed  EUR  25.000.  Employees who manage such budgets earn an 
average of 9% more than employees who do not manage budgets. 
We can also analyse the effect of job content. Based on a  series of scales, 
which attempt to chart job content (see Appendix), indices were formulated for 
the level of responsibility, level of complexity and autonomy in the job. It  can be 
deduced from the analysis that a high degree of autonomy and a high level of 
responsibility for the work of others and for the functioning of a department or 
team are accompanied (all things being equal) by significantly higher pay. In 
particular, the relationship between level of pay and autonomy in the post is 
not obvious. It is not terribly clear here what is  the cause and what is the 
consequence, though it can be deduced from the relationship that a low intrinsic 
pay level (low level of autonomy in the job)  is  not offset by high extrinsic 
remuneration (high pay).  High extrinsic and high intrinsic remuneration go 
together and may reinforce each other. 
Finally, the effect of working hours is more obvious. Although the regression 
is limited to full-time workers, wide differences can still occur within this group 
in terms of number of hours invested in the job per week (including work at 
home, moonlighting, etc.). If we start the scale at 32 working hours per week, 
each hour extra that an employee works generates an average of 0.33% more 
pay. This is a statistically significant effect. 
4.3  Organisational determinants 
Research into the determinants of pay levels has long ignored characteristics on 
the demand side of the labour market. The scarce research which has looked at 
demand-side factors  indicates  that different employers pay employees with 
comparable  'human  capital'  different  amounts  (Groshen,  1991).  Given  the 16 
limited number of data  gathered in this salary survey about employers  or 
organisations,  few  conclusive  remarks  can be  made  on  the  importance  of 
demand-side factors.  This certainly is a serious limitation of employee-based 
wage  surveys.  In  what  follows  we  shall  therefore  limit  ourselves  to  the 
influence of the sector in which the organisation operates (as an indicator of the 
organisation's activity), the size of the organisation and the nationality of the 
parent company. 
Sector. According to the neo-classical theory, employees with the same qualities 
and  equivalent  jobs,  where  the  product  and  factor  markets  are  working 
satisfactorily, receive equal pay, and pay differentials between sectors merely 
reflect compositional effects. In other words, wages in some sectors are indeed 
higher than in others, but this is alleged to be related solely to  the fact that 
organisations and their employees have different characteristics. We will clarify 
this with an example. Since older workers earn more than younger workers, 
and  people  with a  higher education  earn more  than  people with a  lower 
education, shifts in the educational level and the age profile influence the rise in 
average pay within a sector. This is a clear compositional effect. 
The regression analysis shows that it is not only these compositional effects, 
which are  responsible for  differences  between sector  pay levels.  Even after 
controlling for important determinants such as gender, work experience, level 
of  education,  hierarchical  level,  etc.,  we  see  strong  significant  differences 
between sector pay levels. In the regression analysis, the average gross monthly 
salary in the socio-cultural sector was used as a reference category. Pay levels in 
retail and the public services do not deviate significantly from pay levels in the 
socio-cultural sector. If we look at the other sectors, however, clear differences 
emerge. The results indicate a wide sectoral pay differentiation. If we compare 
the poles of the pay hierarchy, we see that the average monthly salary in the 
energy  sector  is  on average  21.8%  higher than in the  socio-cultural  sector 
(Table 3). In this pay hierarchy, the top five positions are taken by the chemical 
industry, banks and insurance companies, the information technology sector 
and the metal industry. The picture of strong sectoral pay differentiation is 
confirmed in international comparisons (Van der Wiel, 1999).  For example, in 
the  early 1990s  the differentiation in Belgium was greater than in Finland, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Canada, Germany, and the US, but 
smaller than in Japan, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. If  we look at the 
increase  in  differentiation  in  the  period  1970-1990,  we  see  that,  with  the 
exception of the UK, pay differentials between sectors rose more strongly in 
Belgium than anywhere else. 
One explanation for  this differentiation which is put forward by the neo-
classical economic theory is that pay differentiation acts as a 'lubricant', which 
keeps the wheels of the labour market turning smoothly. In a well-functioning 
labour market, pay levels in a sector with a tight labour market must rise more 
strongly than in a sector where there are no bottlenecks. This has the effect of 
drawing  in  additional  workers  to  that  sector.  This  additional  influx  then 
excerpts downward pressure on the increased wages on that sector. In the other 
sectors,  by  contrast,  pay  levels  will  rise  as  a  result  of  the  departure  of 17 
employees.  The  balance  is  thus  restored.  This  example  shows  that  pay 
differentiation must promote the adaptation processes on the labour market via 
mobility of labour (Hofman, Compaijen, & Van Ours, 1992). 
It is indeed the case that pay differentials can arise between sectors with a 
high supply of workers  and  those  with a  low  supply of  workers  (Bell  & 
Freeman, 1991; Nord, 1999). However, these pay differentials may be sustained 
if the barriers between these sectors have little 'permeability' (low intersectoral 
mobility). Many barriers can reduce the capacity or willingness of employees to 
transfer to better paying sectors. The result is then market segregation.  This can 
lead to a  'fossilisation'  of pay differentials.  This  process can be fostered by 
differences in productivity increases between sectors. In sectors with rapidly 
rising pay levels thanks to sharply increasing productivity, these higher pay 
levels may also be sustained without an increase in employment, particularly if 
a good deal of labour is substituted by capital at the same time. 
This 'fossilisation' of pay differentials is fairly typical of the Belgian situation. 
The sectoral pay differentiation is not only very high. It is also very stable, with 
the sectoral pay structure undergoing virtually no change. Sectors, which paid 
high salaries in the 1970s, still do so in the 1990s. In industry in particular, the 
pay structure has hardly adapted at all to the changed labour market. Although 
the increases  in labour productivity and unemployment rates  differ widely 
from sector to sector, there is absolutely no relationship between pay levels and 
these differences, which are relevant for  the formation of  pay.  Goubert and 
Heylen (1999)  point out that this can have a deadly effect on the mobility of 
employees. The parallel pay trends, they argue, mean that workers have little 
encouragement to look towards sectors with better future prospects. 
Company size. All things being equal, large companies pay better. If  we compare 
companies with 50  or more employees with companies having fewer than 50 
workers, we see that gross monthly salaries are on average 4%  higher in the 
former group (Table 3).  The gross monthly salary in companies with 200  or 
more  employees  is  no  less  than  6.8%  higher.  Very  large  companies,  in 
particular, pay high wages. For example, the average gross monthly salary in 
companies with at least 500  employees is 11% higher than in companies with 
fewer  than  50  workers.  Company  size  explains  a  substantial  part  of pay 
variation in industrial sectors in particular. A regression analysis which was 
built up separately for industry reveals that gross monthly salaries in industrial 
companies with at least 500 workers is no less than 22.9% higher than the level 
of pay in small industrial companies (Sels, Welkenhuysen-Gybels, Schrijvers, & 
Overlaet, 1999). 
Several studies report this positive effect of company size on pay (Brown & 
Medoff, 1989).  The interpretations do however vary. For example, the higher 
pay in larger companies is seen in some studies as a  compensation for  the 
greater  complexity  of  large  businesses  (Conyon,  1997).  This  reasoning  is 
followed  particularly  in studies  of  management  compensation,  where it is 
assumed  that  larger  companies  also  need  more  capable  managers.  Other 
arguments claim that workers in these companies demand (and receive) higher 
pay as compensation for  the less  pleasurable working climate  (less  personal 18 
atmosphere, stronger division of work, etc.). We would in any event state that 
in our analysis other factors may lurk behind company size, such as differences 
in company performance, capital strength, trade union activity and strength, 
employee mobility, etc. 
Nationality. It is not only company size and sector that have a relatively large 
explanatory power on observed pay differentials;  the  same applies  for  the 
nationality of the parent company. American companies, all things being equal, 
pay an average of 15.7% more than Belgian companies. They are followed in the 
pay hierarchy by German,  British  and French companies.  Here  again,  this 
striking  difference  can  mask  other  characteristics  such  as  company 
perfonnance, the multinational size of these companies, etc. 
Conclusion 
This paper looks at the explanation of pay differentials in Belgium. By way of a 
synthesis, we will conclude with the results  of an analysis  of variance.  An 
analysis of variance allows the share of each determinant in the explanation of 
pay differentials to be shown. We would repeat here that the characteristics 
involved in the analysis are able to explain 65.9% of the observed differences 
between monthly salaries of 'white-collar workers' (Adjusted R2). The result of 
the analysis of variance given below shows the contribution of each individual 
detenninant to this overall explanatory power. 19 
Table 4.  Contribution of each individual determinant to the overall explanatory power. 
Results of an analysis of variance. 
Individual characteristics 
- Work experience 
- Level of education 
- Gender 
Total contribution of  individual detenninants 
Job-related characteristics 
- Hierarchical level 
- Functional domain 
- Size of budget managed 
- Working hours (starting at 32 hours) 
- Number of subordinates 
- Level of responsibility 
- Level of autonomy in the job 
- Level of job complexity 
Total contribution of  job-related detenninants 
Organisational characteristics 
- Sector 
- Nationality of the parent company 
- Organisation size 
Total contribution of  organisational detenninants 
Total 
Contribution to the 
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The  five  most  important determinants,  in order  of  importance,  are:  work 
experience, level of education, hierarchical level, sector and nationality of the 
parent company.  The  impact  of  work experience  exceeds  that of  all  other 
determinants. 
On the one hand the explanatory models, based on a human capital logic, are 
confirmed by the dominant explanatory power of the individual characteristics 
(56.49%).  And  yet  it was  shown  in  this  paper  that  plausible  alternative 
explanations exist for this strong effect of level of education, work experience 
and  gender,  and  that  these  alternatives  moreover  take  more  account  of 
characteristics on the demand side. On the other hand, the regression model 
removes  the  illusion  of  the  simplicity  of  human  capital  explanations.  In 
particular, the claim that job-related and organisational characteristics are of no 
importance in explaining pay differentials must be refuted.  Both dusters of 
determinants make a substantial contribution (23.83% for job-related, 19.68% for 20 
organisational characteristics).  In fact  we suspect that the  influence  of  job-
related and organisational characteristics are underestimated in our analyses, 
because the analyses do not include important characteristics on the demand 
side (degree of unionisation, company performance, perceived tightness of the 
labour market, etc.),  or are particularly difficult to measure in an employee-
based wage survey (complexity of the job,  autonomy, capital intensity, etc.). 
There is also a lack of information about the career of the employee. In line with 
internal labour market theories,  it may be that pay levels are not so much 
determined by characteristics of an employee's present job, but much rather by 
the characteristics of the career path on which the employee is engaged. Despite 
these constraints, the job-related and organisational characteristics are still able 
to explain a substantial part of the pay differentials observed. 
Appendix 
The factors 'responsibility in the job', 'autonomy' and 'degree of complexity', which were included 
in  the  regression  analysis  as  determinants,  are  the  result  of  a personal  assessment  by  the 
respondents. To this end, a battery of items was put to  respondents in the questionnaire, each of 
which  had  to  be  evaluated  on  a four-point  scale  (ranging  from  disagree  completely  to  agree 
completely). Following a reliability analysis, three ten-point scales were constructed on the basis 
of these items, which  show the degree of responsibility,  degree of autonomy and  degree of job 
complexity as assessed by the respondent. For each of these scales, the items on which they are 
based are indicated below. 
Responsibility (Cronbach's Alpha: .824) 
'I  have a good deal of responsibility for other people's work';  'I  often  have to take decisions  in 
which  a mistake  could  have  expensive  or  serious  consequences';  'I  carry  a good  deal  of 
responsibility for the future of others'; 'I carry a good deal of responsibility for the functioning of a 
department or team'. 
Autonomy (Cronbach's Alpha: .837) 
'My superior is constantly looking over my shoulders'; 'I can decide for myself how I do my work'; 
'My working method is largely prescribed'; 'I decide for myself when I carry out a task';  'My work 
rate is imposed entirely by others'. 
Degree of complexity (Cronbach's Alpha: .796) 
'I am often confronted with unexpected events in my work'; 'Much of my work is routine'; 'I have to 
keep my eye on lots of things at the same time in my work'; 'My work consists almost entirely of 
difficult tasks';  'My job demands a high  degree of skill';  'My job demands that I constantly  learn 
new things'. 21 
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